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THURSDAY
AUGUST 26, 1954

I called Doug Dillon this morning, and he is going to support our telegram to Washington. The same holds true for John Hughes.

De Staercke called to say he had gone to Mendès to ask about the proposal made by Spaak to Mendès yesterday and had met with an exceedingly chilly reception.

David Schoenbrun and Howard Smith came to see me. David says Mendès has proved himself a thorough-going cynic and is not to be relied upon.

I read a dossier confidentially given me this morning on the activities and background of some of the members of Mendès' immediate entourage.

Marquis Childs lunched with us. He takes an entirely pessimistic view, as did Schoenbrun and Smith, of any practical alternative in the way of German rearmament to that provided by the EDC Treaty. He thinks Allen Dulles a far abler man than Foster because of his better sense of dealing with people and of assessing their characters, although he considers Foster a man of great intellectual ability.

We cleared with Dillon and sent off the following cable:

"SENT: SECSTATE WASHINGTON. NIACT. 796

"RPTD INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON 198
HICOG BONN 145
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 44
AMEMBASSY ROME 68
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 61
AMLEGATION LUXEMBOURG 38.

"FROM BRUCE AND DILLON.

"We have found surpr[illegible]ng agreement among number of sources that program of Mendès-France to kill EDC Treaty was conducted on following lines:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY CEC DATE 7-1-81
[illegible]or XD[illegible]EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑
RELEASE DENIED ☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

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"1. He made first effort to get France out of commitment to present EDC Treaty to French Assembly at time of his investiture and failed.

"2. During the confrontation on EDC he appeared to discard 'Little NATO' formula proposed by anti-EDC group in Quai d'Orsay and to adopt an approach based on adoption of EDC Treaty. This decision gave hope to pro-Europeans in Cabinet who believed that Mendès would be forced to reasonable agreement at Brussels and then would give his support to EDC in French Assembly debate.

"3. In fact, pro-European French were completely outmaneuvered. French protocol on EDC was taken to Brussels with knowledge it would be wholly unacceptable to other governments. This apparently was the tactic of the anti-EDC group. (It is for this reason that anti-EDC group included in protocol 'essential provisions' which they knew were in absolute contradiction with EDC Treaty and could not have been accepted without killing EDC in other countries as well as in France.)

"4. Mendès conducted careful campaign to place blame for defeat on other nations. In this, pro-Europeans were again outmaneuvered because their presence gave credence to his protestation of being pro-European but in helpless position. Mendès continues this campaign even now, imposing complete hush on new efforts of Spaak and Chancellor after Brussels meeting to give him important additional concessions (COLED 25).

"5. Having made his case that EDC Treaty could not be saved, Mendès then informed US and UK Governments of his willingness to give political sovereignty to Germany and his desire to find a new solution for German reammament. Since, as far as we know, there has been no adverse official reaction from either country, he may well be interpreting silence as assurance that France could participate with veto in new negotiations on German reammament and that France

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could now revive the 'Little NATO' proposal of the anti-EDC group in Quai d'Orsay for these negotiations.

"Mendès is not even being neutral in EDC debate. Treaty is being presented on basis of anti-EDC reports of Assembly committees and Mendès is speaking openly against Treaty itself before these committees. Moreover, there will be no commitment from French Assembly to approve German rearmament, even in unacceptable form of 'Little NATO'. On the contrary, Mendès must give commitment to return to French Assembly for an uncertain decision after long argument, even on questionable assumption that agreement could be reached in such negotiations.

"6. The 'Little NATO' approach means presentation of EDC Treaty to Assembly in worst possible manner. It will be very attractive for many French deputies. It promises new and long negotiation on German rearmament; it gives assurance that Germany can be kept from full membership in NATO with controls on Germany's right to provide defense; it means a near certainty that German rearmament will become subject of Four-Power talks, particularly if Mendès makes his intended statement about talks with Soviets; it suggests vain and dangerous hope that 'peace' in Europe will arrive without German rearmament.

"7. It matters little to Quai d'Orsay group that Chancellor entirely unwilling to discuss 'Little NATO' proposal (Bonn tel 576); that Benelux countries consider it might well result in United States disassociating itself from Europe; that proposal is directed at very heart of NATO and therefore has no chance of acceptance. This Quai group's purpose of killing EDC and postponing German rearmament will have been achieved if Assembly believes 'Little NATO' Scheme is possible alternative and, whether it was intention or not, Soviet Russia will have been handed a major victory probably disastrous to Atlantic policy of Western nations. DILLON."

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I talked to Livie at 4:30. He said they were stewing in the Department over our message of early this morning and had already sent a communication to Churchill on the subject. He indicated a division of opinion exists in the Department as to the advisability of following this course.

I was in consultation with Tommy and Monnet, and we are anxiously awaiting definite news from the Department. We have already received a preliminary telegram saying the question has been referred to the British for comment.

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